A GOOD DEAL is now known about the incidence of plague in this country during the early modern period, but attempts to probe the wider impact of these epidemics on the general history of the era have been rare. This is curious, for plague occupies a prominent position in tlhe historiography of the later middle ages; but while the disease remained a major factor in the lives of Englishmen for nearly two centuries after the close of the medieval period, the modem historian can find no place for it in his survey of the forces moulding the development of Tudor and Stuart England. This essay is an attempt to examine the demographic, social, economic, and moral impact of plague epidemics. It makes no attempt to cover the chronological and geographical patterns of the disease, or to describe its medical aspects, since these areas are well reviewed by recent published work.'
confined to the warmer months of the year, coming to a peak between July and September; this reflected the temperature requirements of the flea, but its effect was to concentrate epidemics in the season of maximum activity in the pre-industrial economy, which displayed a marked annual rhythm. It also helped to prolong outbreaks over two or even more years, punctuated by winter respites.
If we are to appreciate the effect of these epidemics it is essential to appreciate the slowness of their spreading within the afflicted community, a movement which could well be of the order of a hundred yards per week or even less: this is surely a phenomenon unique to plague and accounts for much of its impact. It is derived from the aversion of the rats to movement, but it guaranteed both a maximum nervous tension and a virtual certainty of escape by ffight, aspects to which we shall return. The disease was also a familiar one, since its symptoms were distinctive and notorious after centuries of outbreaks in Europe: at the beginning of the 1665 London epidemic "they terrified each other with remembrances of a former pestilence".2 This element of panic, leading to flight for those able to afford it and hysteria in those left behind, was heightened by the rapidity with which death followed infection and the very high mortality rate among sufferers, rarely less than fifty per cent. A sermon of c. 1600 speaks of the disease as "manifestly different from all other diseases, not only for the speediness thereof in death, but also for the outrage thereof in those that feel the same".3
Two other aspects of plague deserve special attention. The first is that it was distinctively a disease of the poorer classes-indeed it became known as "the poor's plague". Modem studies confirm this impression, revealing very few upper-class victims indeed. This may be explained in part by the withdrawal of the rich to the countryside at the beginning of epidemics, but must largely be due to the nature of the buildings inhabited by different social groups, for well-maintained houses with tiled roofs would harbour far fewer rats than the ramshackle huts of the poor. The truth of this is well illustrated by the 1665 London plague, when most of the city's aldermen and suburb's justices stayed at their posts -yet none died.4 The second aspect is that plague is essentially a disease of the household, a characteristic again derived from rodent infestation of the family home. Once the rats of a particular house were infected, it was likely that most, if not all, of its human inhabitants would develop the disease. Thus the mortality pattern of plague reflects the structure of contemporary lower-class households, with no particularly pronounced preference for young or old, male or female, which is independent of this factor. Most of the characteristics of plague which have been emphasized here contrast in a more or less marked way with the attributes of the other epidemic disease of the period, and taken together they do much to explain the uniquely disruptive and disturbing role which plague played.
The demographic influence of bubonic plague is the most obvious yet least important of its major aspects. At the time of the last major epidemic in 1665-66, it is unlikely that more than twenty per cent of the population lived in settlements sufficiently urbanized to present a high risk of infection, and this modest figure itself represents a substantial increase on the sixteenth-century level.6 It is obvious from this fact alone that plague could not have been a crucial factor in determining the course of population change on a national scale. Its influence lay rather in the effect it had on the development of individual towns, and on the demographic structure of all towns. In assessing this influence one must distinguish sharply between the frequent minor outbreaks and the rarer major ones, for though the lesser incidents caused much disruption, they often caused no more than ten or twenty deaths. Maidstone, for instance, has records of plague deaths in twenty-four of the 106 years between 1562 and 1667, but only six of them at most could be classed as serious.6
Thus it is with the major outbreaks that we are concerned: as a general rule, the larger the city, the more often it was infected. London, with a population far greater than any provincial city, was hit by nine major epidemics during the period we are considering, while the main provincial cities suffered on about six occasions, like Norwich (1578-79, 1583, 1591, 1603, 1625-26 and 1665-66).7 Smaller towns were struck twice on average during the period -Chester in 1603-6 and 1647-48, Lichfield in 1593 and 1645-46, and Leicester in 1593-94 and 1610-11, for instance.8 Often the proportion of the population killed in these rarer outbreaks was higher than in the bigger towns. The interval between major epidemics could be as short as five or six years, but was more commonly ten or twenty years and could sometimes be much longer; London escaped for twenty-nine years before 1665, York was similarly fortunate for over forty years before 1604, and Worcester until 1609.9 Such long remissions were unusual and the terminating epidemic was often marked by especial virulence, caused by overcrowded housing and the lack of that partial immunity which regular exposure to mild strains of the disease seems to have encouraged. It will readily appear from the foregoing that plague did not appear in most cities with sufficient frequency to act as a major restriction to population growth, and that in many places it was possible for a generation to mature between major outbreaks. This is, however, less true of the larger cities and least true of London and its surroundings.
How many people did the major epidemics kill? Here there is a temptation to dismiss the higher totals as the exaggerations of an unstatistical age, but theie is in fact 6 Penelope Corfield, ' So it would appear that epidemics had no long-term influence on town population levels and that damage was quickly and effortlessly made good. Although this generalization does seem to be consistent with the experience of many towns, it should not be regarded as of universal application. The crucial factor was the presence in the countryside of a population surplus, ready and willing to flock to the towns to replace epidemic losses. But when there was no surplus, or that surplus could not be lured into particular depopulated towns, the situation changed. The problem rarely arose in the period roughly 1560-1640 since the rural population seems then to have been growing with notable vigour, so the only towns which experienced any difficulty were those which were too depressed to attract poor migrants. A good example here is York, which complained of depopulation after its mid-sixteenth-century epidemics.19 Such situations were not common, but far more frequent were the problems of towns hit hard by the plagues of the period 1642-1667, when there seems to have been a much smaller population surplus in the countryside, quite probably no surplus at all in some regions. Here we find many more examples of towns taking decades to replace their epidemic losses when their economy is not strong, and half a century or more when the economy concerned is positively weak. Among larger towns Southampton provides us with an example of a town incapable for the remainder of the seventeenth century of replacing the heavy losses of the plague of 1666, while among recently studied smaller towns, Ashby-de-la-Zouch and Stafford both suffer decades of population stagnation after their epidemics of the 1640s. 
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The influence of bubonic plague in England, 1500-1667 ally true that this decade forms a demographic turning-point for the whole of the seventeenth century for many towns, and probably for the whole country, and this effect was intensified very greatly if, as was often the case, a major epidemic coincided with this crucial phase. However the significance of this aspect of plague is somewhat reduced by its restriction to a single generation by the disappearance of the disease after 1667.
Plague has another aspect to its demographic influence in its effect on the structure, as opposed to the size, of urban populations. Most killer diseases of the period struck principally at children, leaving the basic adult social structure relatively unscathed and parents free to replace lost children as far as possible. In contrast, plague seems to have affected all age groups and sexes roughly in proportion to their distribution within the infected community, although there does seem to have been a rather heavier mortality among men, and young adults in general.21 Presumably these minor variations depended on the likelihood of being bitten by a flea and to some extent on previous exposure to the disease. But much of this must remain speculative since our ignorance of the basic demographic characteristics of the population at risk renders attempts to construct specific mortality rates largely futile.
We can, however, be fairly sure that these epidemics did play a part in shaping the particular demographic structure of pre-industrial society. They injected into this structure certain irregularities which lasted as long as the generations concerned: in the rare and invaluable statistical survey of the city of Lichfield prepared by Gregory King in 1695, there is a general lack of balance in the distribution of the sexes and age cohorts, most pronounced in the lack of people aged between fifty and fifty-five: this must surely have been caused by the loss of most of the children born between 1640 and 1645 in the great plague of 164546.22 It is notable here that though young children were not unusually susceptible to the disease, their loss was never replaced, unlike older age groups which were replaced by migrants of roughly the same age. Since plague killed a higher proportion of adults than most other diseases, and especially more men, it disrupted the nuclear family far more, for not only was the family the basic economic as well as social unit, but families were far better prepared to weather the loss of women than men. In any case the disruption of marriages prevented the immediate replacement of dead children and increased the already high proportion of orphans.
Thus although plague's influence over the demographic development of this country was a significant one, this aspect of the disease has been subject to considerable exaggeration. Far If isolation was the reaction of authority, the response of the individual was equally simple: flight. The slow spread and urban location of plague meant that evacuation, even over quite short distances, was a natural and effective precaution. The migration was rapid, and took place at the beginning of the epidemic, before effective measures could be taken against it, or the countryside learned to shun the townsman. At the beginning of the Salisbury plague of 1627 we are told that everyone with friends in the country "did fly as if it were out of an house on fire", most of the wealthy having left in four days.26 The best documented evacuation is that of Norwich in 1665, which was largely completed during the two weeks following a marked rise in the plague death rate in early July.27 These migrations, which should be regarded as a standard feature of nearly all serious epidemics, were fatal in themselves to the continuance of any sort of normal life within the towns concerned; the class which could afford to leave was also the one which monopolized the personnel of local government and owned most larger business concerns. The result of its withdrawal could only be the collapse of both the local economy and municipal administration.
Here we are tempted to suspect that "collapse" is too strong a word to describe the situation, yet a wealth of contemporary description confirms its validity. We are told that the only civic officials left in Salisbury were the mayor and two petty constables, and that the flight in Exeter closed most of its businesses and brought its "H. E The influence of bubonic plague in England, 1500-1667 administration to a halt.28 In Great Yarmouth "the poor are deprived of the charity and trade of the inhabitan-ts, who are fled, so that it is like a country village", while in Chester "almost all persons of ability have left the said city, there remaining for the most part only the poor, who are altogether deprived of trading".29 A significant aspect of these migrations is that they are much more typical of the seventeenth than the sixteenth century. In Exeter 1503 saw two bailiffs and two mayors die at their posts in succession, and in 1537 four members of the corporation died, yet in 1570 we are told that the "chiefest men" left the city and in 1625 the whole upper class fled, leaving behind one of the worst administrative and economic collapses on record.ss The great Elizabethan plagues seem to have taken their toll of city rulers who stayed at their posts, and economic damage was caused by isolation rather than the closing down of businesses consequent upon their owners' departure -thus both the Bristol and Norwich epidemics of the reign took the lives of several aldermen.31 Yet in the seventeenth century we rarely hear of the death of any leading townsman, and the typical example becomes that set by Samuel Newton, alderman of Cambridge, whose diary records the fact that he spent the months between June and October of 1665 with his family at Waterbeach, some six miles from the infected town. 32 We should not exaggerate the extent of this trend, for there did exist panic ffights in the sixteenth century and prominent examples, like those of York in 1631 and London in 1665, of administrations which remained at their posts; however even here the wealthier traders without civic responsibilities still left.ss The phenomenon remains a significant one, and points to a dwindling sense of civic-mindedness and a disintegrating awareness of communal bonds and loyalties. It is easy to censure the refugees, yet those who did stay behind often suffered grievously for their sense of duty: a Ludlow petty official claims that "he was not only in danger of his life but [also those] of his wife and children and his house shut up for a season and lost his customers and his work and his servants departed from him.""s Towns did sometimes try to force officials to stay by fining absentees, and occasionally extended the measure to include all citizens, but such acts could only be effective in minor outbreaks, and Norwich was more realistic in ordering petty officials to return only if they had omitted to appoint a deputy.-"
The collapse of administration and commerce are but two examples of the cessation of most kinds of public activity. Schools were disbanded at the first sign of danger- Thus an epidemic whose cost in lives could be relatively modest could impoverish the majority of the surviving population, causing problems of unemployment, hunger, and public finance which were unprecedented in the experience of the local authorities concerned. Relief was usually dispensed as a small weekly dole, sufficient to avoid starvation, and when food supplies failed with the collapse of markets, provisions were supplied in bulk too. In the absence of any organization specifically designed to meet such an emergency, the burden on town governments and rural justices was a heavy one: the Bury plague of 1637 cost over £2,000, at Preston £856 was spent in fifteen weeks, the minor Salisbury outbreak of 1604-5 cost the corporation £589, and Norwich spent over £8,000 in 1665-66.'2 It is difficult for those unfamiliar with contemporary financial values to appreciate the relatively vast size of these sums, usually greater than the normal total annual expenditure of the towns concerned, and representing a far heavier burden on the taxpayer than all other regular forms of taxation -further impoverishing the community at a time of economic difficulty. The influence ofbubonic plague in England, 1500-1667
The ultimate cause of these difficulties was the failure of local commerce, a topic of great importance. The commonest single symptom of this damage was the suspension of fairs and markets, a detail easy to pass over without full appreciation of its significance. Towns relied on their markets as their chief source of food, raw materials and customers for their shops and stalls, while fairs were vital for the organization of inter-regional trade. Once an epidemic was established both these commercial gatherings quickly petered out, through both official closure, due to the risk of spreading infection, and the natural reluctance of countryfolk to attend at the risk of their lives." These closures could last for up to six or nine months in many cases, and the resultant lack of both raw materials and buyers quickly closed down local businesses, even if they could survive the flight of their owners. Temporary markets were set up in suburban fields (many towns retain traditions of their location) but they were always very inadequate substitutes, since attendance at them demanded either desperation or eccentricity: one such market organized outside Norwich, the country's second city, in 1666 attracted only one solitary Quaker."
The last major plague in 1665-66 was said to have been "an infinite interruption to the whole trade of the nation"." In Exeter we are told of the "deadness of trade in these last years, more especially in the year of God's visitation, [1625] wherein was almost no trading"." In Devon the vital textile industry, dependent on the frequent exchange of part-finished goods, could be depressed even by rumours of epidemics.47 A tract of 1643 refers to the plague ended seven years before in Newcastle: "thy trading departed, as thou never yet recovered it".48 These illustrations suggest that plague could have a very marked effect on urban economies, but they remain impressions, often derived from prejudiced sources.
Tlhe problem oftesting the validity of such pronouncements is that reliable statistical series which might be used to measure the economic performance of individual towns are rare, and always difficult to interpret. The best source is provided by government regulation of the cloth industry. Figures for the export of shortcloths from London indicate that they fell by about twenty-five per cent in the plague year of 1603, but this would be distorted by the diversion oftrade to other ports.4" Reduced levels of cloth production are indicated in Norwich, where the cloths produced by the alien community fell by about twenty-five per cent in number in 1578: this is a surprisingly modest reduction considering the severity of the epidemic, but it is probable that the alien community found migration to the countryside far more difficult than the native one, so that clothmaking continued at a modest level throughout the plague.Y0 More substantial damage is indicated at Colchester, where the total damage -these are necessarily derived from minor epidemics since markets closed in major ones, but in Reading the market toll income was halved for thirty-seven weeks, and in Beverley, which was not itself infected although its region was, the income from the wool market was reduced from £46 to £36 in 1665, indicating the general depression which afflicted the hinterlands of towns in these circumstances.52
The slight Chester plague of 1604 led to a distinct recession in the city which is reflected in the records of the shoemakers' company.53 The number of adult wageearners employed in the city's shoemaking businesses dropped from a level of fiftytwo to fifty-four in previous years to forty-one in the plague year, recovering to fifty-nine in the following year: the epidemic seems chiefly to have forced larger undertakings to cut their workforces. Mortality among employees could also cause dislocation, for the newly-established Newcastle glass industry lost so many of its skilled workmen in 1636 that production was still held back late in the following year."M Some final figures from the corporation accounts of Oswestry after its severe epidemic of 1559 reveal the chaos produced among the tenants of corporation
properties."M Three of the five tanners have left the town; of the nine glovers, one is dead, two are too poor to pay their rent, and two have fled; seven of the sixteen butchers have left, and three more are dead, while three of the five leather-workers have left. Here the damage is caused primarily by flight rather than death, probably always true of the self-employed class to which these figures relate. Once an epidemic was over, normality in industrial and commercial life seems to have been restored with remarkable speed. Temporary trading patterns were usually abandoned again, although some towns had to fight to restore their rights -York, for instance, threatened to fine those of its merchants who had transferred their businesses to nearby country towns and were tardy in returning to the city.56 Recorded instances of this kind are relatively uncommon. Complaints that plague caused the permanent decline of particular towns are rather more frequent, though none is at all easy to substantiate. There is circumstantial evidence that some towns -York and Southampton are good examples -found recovery from plague damage far more difficult than did more prosperous places. All examples feature towns which were economically weak before the epidemic, which came to accelerate an inevitable decline: this is not to deny the part played by the disease in damaging the economies concerned, but rather to suggest that it acted as a precipitant of decline rather than a primary cause.
The influence of bubonic plague in England, 1500-1667 Plague's economic influence was too general to be detectable in this specific fashion: sooner or later it was a basic fact of all urban life, so that its effect was to impoverish and weaken towns as a species. As we have seen, epidemics damaged healthy towns in an infected region, as well as the more obvious ones, so that we must see it as a general discouragement to sustained economic growth, periodically sapping the capital of the self-employed through the suspension of their business activities, and by making urban life unpleasant and insecure, encouraging the investment of surplus capital in rural properties rather than urban trade and industry. Thus it must be added to the long list of other factors which delayed until the industrial revolution the achievement of sustained economic growth.
The impact of plague upon the societies which experienced it is another topic of major significance. The most common effect was the encouragement of social conflict, that fragmentation of previously cohesive urban societies which took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The quarantine system was the object of a very natural resentment, intensified by the bitterness induced by the escape of the rich. When trying to remove infected people to the pesthouse, the mayor of Salisbury was asked "whether I came of a woman or a beast that I should do so bloody an act upon poor people in their condition".57 A Haverfordwest woman protests that quarantine treats her "worse than a whore".58 An explosive mixture was produced by the combination of the similarity of quarantine to imprisonment (suggesting an element of punishment) the breaking up of families by removal to the pesthouse, the injustice of the escape of the rich whom the authorities represented and the collapse of the economic and administrative structure, and all this in an atmosphere highly charged with nervous tension.
The result was often a partial revolt, with the threat of a far more serious uprising in the background. The quarantine system was widely resisted so that the "unruly infected" in Norwich obliged the city to appoint special prisons in 1631, and in 1666 to provide whipping post and stocks at the pesthouse.59 "The unruliness of the infected persons and want of government" were apparent in Manchester in 163160 despite a statute of 1603 which reinforced the powers of the authorities in dealing with breaches of quarantine by prescribing heavier penalties, including death., Leicester reacted by instructing its watchmen to open fire with crossbows on offenders.62 A more general threat to stability came from the deep resentment caused by the flight of the rich, which threw the poor out of work, deprived local government of its tax revenue, and weakened its ability to exert authority. In Exeter the unemployed poor rioted, threatening to burn the city down if the rich did not return to 57Slack, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 57. 
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Alan D. Dyer help them," while Salisbury's stern mayor John Ivie was faced with mobs roaming the streets demanding relief and threats to loot the homes of the absent rich." On reflection he considered plague to be God's judgment on that "great, unjust, rude rabble"." The poor resented his authoritarian and puritan rule to such an extent that they became aligned with religious and political conservatism in the disputes leading up to the civil war.66 Although these epidemic antagonisms rarely reached the point of actual violence, the risk of it remained a constant pre-occupation of town governments: the mayor of York worries that "the poorer sort will not be ruled", while the town clerk of Norwich writes that "we are in greater fear of the poor than of the plague, all our money being gone".67
The most disturbing tensions were probably those set up between individuals, as fear of infection ate away at all social connexions. A plague sermon refers to this strain of avoiding contact -"daily devices amongst ourselves, how to avoid and escape dangers".68 The situation led to the abandonment of the deepest instincts of sociability, a profoundly disturbing development when mutual assistance and comfort from relatives, friends, and neighbours was the chief source of security in a hazardous world. A Bury man refers to his difficulties when "I could get nobody to help me and that all my household fled from me and left me comfortless (in respect that at that time my man died of the sickness) when myself and my wife were both lame"." Cupper's sermons refer to this: "a man's dearest friends and kinsfolks forsake him. Many that are sick of this disease have none at all to attend them or visit them, and so they die without any looking to and without any physician for body or soul."70 Hodges refers to the state of those shut up in domestic quarantine, "the consternation of those thus separated from all society", and attributes their frequent deaths to the low state of their morale.71 This erosion of the powerful bonds which held together pre-industrial communities must have left an indelible mark on those who experienced it, perhaps too deep to write about; only Samuel Pepys bared his soul to his diary in admitting that plague was "making us cruel as dogs one to another".72
Epidemics also affected the established relationship between country and town. Townsmen were shunned, and could only find refuge if they had some prior rural connexion. Londoners were particularly subject to this antagonism, but differences in dress between countryfolk and the citizens of the larger towns made the identification of refugees so simple that it could be a general occurrence -Worcester
The influence of bubonic plague in England, 1500-1667 people for instance found that "the best was shunned, stoved off, turned back again".73 Further resentment was created by the failure of country people to contribute to the relief of infected towns in their neighbourhood. A statute of 1603 formalized a common arrangement by authorizing taxes on parishes within a fivemile radius of an infected town, extendible to ten miles or even a whole county.7' Yet these sums frequently proved almost impossible to collect -Norwich had exhausted its own money by 9 August 1666 and was awaiting the help of rural taxation, but as late as 10 October, when the emergency was almost over, no money had appeared and there were reports that most villages had produced derisory sums.75
Thus the effect of plague was to produce antagonisms between many established social groups, between family, neighbours, and friends, rich and poor, town and country. Probably the most significant casualty was the long-established relationship between rich and poor. The financial contrast between the two groups was a glaring one, yet both classes lived cheek-by-jowl in small and tightly knit communities; extended conflict is, however, rare before the seventeenth century. The system had always depended on paternalistic idealism from the upper class and passive deference from the lower one. The plague experience, and especially the flight of the rich, helped to erode this understanding, which was in any case in decline.
Besides weakening social cohesiveness, plague created a high degree of mobility, both social and geographical. Adult deaths created openings in the economic, social, and political hierarchy which were filled by those who would have been excluded by a more stable system; the effect was intensified by the way the unpleasantness and insecurity of town life encouraged the rich and successful to move to the countryside as soon as possible, leaving more opportunities behind them. Geographical mobility was increased by the influx of immigrants from the countryside which so quickly replaced epidemic losses. This certainly helped to strengthen the links between country and town -a quarter of the population of Norwich had been born outside the city according to a census of 1693 -but it also discouraged the development of a distinctly "urban" outlook and weakened the old sense of towns as clearly distinct capsules within their walls, in the countryside but not of it. 76 The sudden removal of a substantial proportion of a town's population, to be replaced by strangers, tended to weaken the transmission of specifically urban traditions and customs, the rich inheritance from the middle ages of processions, drama, and festivals which was so gravely damaged during these years. Other forces -conspicuously protestantism -were at work here, but even the temporary cancellation of customary activities provided a pretext for their permanent abandonment.
The last broad aspect of plague to be considered is its mental and moral effect. A mere thirty years after the last epidemic Richard Baxter wrote, "It is scarce possible for people that live in a time of health and security to apprehend the dreadfulness of that pestilence".77 The fessional classes in the years after 1660. At the same time rich traders stopped their automatic exodus to the countryside. This trend served to erode the old distinction between the landed upper class of the country and the monied rulers of the towns, although the new stability of the urban 6lite inevitably rendered it less open to wealthy newcomers. It must also be acknowledged that the secularism and self-confident optimism of social and intellectual life from the later seventeenth century onwards must owe something to this liberation from the threat of epidemic disaster on its old scale.
SUMMARY
There are now many studies of specialized aspects of plague, and some useful general surveys, but no extended study devoted to the impact of the disease on the wider life of the community in the early modem period. This essay first examines briefly some of the salient features of plague epidemics which combined to make them unique in their effects and distinguish plague from other epidemic disease of the time. The first of the major aspects dealt with is the demographic role of plague; it is shown to have limited significance as a determinant of population levels nationally, since it was mostly confined to the towns and could not stem the heavy growth in the countryside. But it did help to shape the character of urban populations by influencing the demographic structure and encouraging mobility. In the social and economic sphere plague was much more influential, chiefly through the paralysis of normal life produced by isolation practices and the flight of the rich. This damaged the social fabric at a number of levels and caused extensive economic damage. The disease encouraged the marked religious feeling of the period, and especially nonconformity and puritanism. The disappearance of the disease after 1667 can be associated with the reversal of a number of these factors, including urban growth and secularism.
Although attempts are made to quantify where possible, plague's influenee is very general, and its effect is often to strengthen existing trends, so that clear-cuit conclusions are hard to reach.
